Motivated by one of the leading intermodal logistics suppliers in the United States, we consider an internal pricing mechanism for managing a fleet of service units (shipping containers) flowing in a closed queueing network. Nodes represent geographic locations and arcs represent travel between them. Customer requests for arcs arrive over time, and the problem is to find an accept/reject policy that maximizes the long-run time average reward rate from accepting requests.
Introduction
Consider a firm that manages a fleet of K service units that circulate in a closed queueing network. We represent this network as a directed graph G = (N , E) with nodes N and directed arcs E ⊆ N × N . An arc ij originates at node i and terminates at node j. We allow self-directed arcs, which we denote by ii.
We denote the set of all units by K = {1, 2, . . . , K}. Demand for arc ij ∈ E arrives according to a Poisson process with rate λ ij , where we assume 0 < λ ij < ∞ for all ij ∈ E. If there is no unit available at node i when a request for arc ij arrives, i.e. there is a stockout, then the request is rejected and no reward is earned. Otherwise, the controller may either accept or reject the request. If the request is accepted, then an arc-dependent reward r ij is collected and an available unit is allocated. This unit subsequently arrives at node j in a deterministic amount of time τ ij , where 0 < τ ij < ∞ for all ij ∈ E. It then waits behind other units until being allocated again. The controller's problem is to choose an accept/reject policy that maximizes the long-run time average expected reward.
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Fleet management in intermodal logistics
This is the essence of the problem faced by Hub Group (Hub), one of the leading third party logistics suppliers in the United States, with whom we have had many in-depth discussions. The company generates annual revenues of more than $1 billion in their intermodal services business, in which they arrange the long-distance movement of their customers' freight from one location to another. Intermodal transportation combines the door-to-door convenience of trucking, with the long-haul economy of rail. Through its exceptional relationships with railroads and local trucking companies, and access to a dedicated fleet of shipping containers, Hub arranges the entire intermodal transaction on behalf of its customers. Among its many customers are consumer products manufacturers and major retailers, such as Walmart, Home Depot, and
Target (Murphy, 2004) . In recent years the intermodal industry has experienced strong growth. Today, more than 20% of U.S. railroad revenue comes from intermodal, and this is expected to soon exceed that of coal (Association of American Railroads, 2004).
On an average day, the firm arranges thousands of load movements, which for the most part are full truckload. Such massive scale creates opportunities for significant financial impact through operational advances.
In their "Premier Service Network," Hub manages a fleet of thousands of shipping containers, which we call fleet boxes, that flow on rail lines between locations strategically scattered throughout the country. In total there are more than 20 Hub locations, which are represented by the nodes N in our network, and transportation connections between them are represented by the arcs E. For the purpose of this paper, the number of fleet boxes is fixed at K, and so the cost of holding fleet boxes is sunk. In addition to using fleet boxes, the firm may also use rail boxes to satisfy customer demand, obtained directly from the railroads on a transaction-by-transaction basis.
A typical intermodal transaction is as follows. A customer contacts the firm requesting that they arrange movement of a full container load from Los Angeles (LA) to Chicago. Typically the customer wants this load to be moved within the next 24 hours or sooner. The dispatcher enters this and other information into an information system that subsequently suggests several different options. For our purposes, there are two main options from which the dispatcher must choose: either use a fleet box or a rail box. Whereas sometimes a fleet box is not physically available, and hence not an option, generally a rail box always is.
Once an appropriate box is identified as being available in the LA area, the dispatcher arranges for the rail line-haul and also for local trucking services, known as drayage, provided by a select group of drayage partners. The physical flow is as follows. A truck first moves the box to the customer loading location, if it is not already there. After the box is loaded, a truck then moves it to the rail ramp in time enough to meet the train schedule. The box then spends several days in transit, until arriving in Chicago where another truck meets it and promptly delivers it to the local destination. After the box is emptied, if it is a fleet box it is either kept at the destination site, or moved to a storage lot. At that time it becomes available to dispatchers for allocation to new loads leaving Chicago. Hence queueing takes place at the nodes, which the firm manages closely because idle boxes don't earn revenue; storage costs are insignificant. In contrast, a rail box is typically returned to the railroad.
The margins earned on fleet box moves versus rail box moves vary in sign and magnitude across the network. The margin consists of the revenue earned minus costs incurred, which include payments made to the railroads and drayage partners. The dispatcher has the flexibility to use whichever option is best for the network, and the firm's customers, overall.
We model the decision to use a fleet box as the "accept" decision, and the decision to use a rail box as the "reject" decision. The rewards r ij represent the average difference in margin earned from a fleet box versus a rail box. The times τ ij represent the transit time incurred on the railroad, on the order of days, plus the drayage time, on the order of hours. An important part of the value proposition promised by railroads is low variability in transit times, which has significantly improved in recent years and continues to do so (McCrea, 2004) . Hence, assuming deterministic times τ is a reasonable approximation to reality, although this is important only in our numerical simulations; other classical assumptions such as using the exponential distribution are completely unrealistic. Also, optimizing long-run time average rewards is reasonable because thousands of transactions occur daily, and each has a duration of only a few days. Data such as average demand rates change on a much longer time scale than this, say quarterly.
Internal pricing as a control mechanism
The goal in managing this system is to keep fleet boxes moving on profitable lanes (arcs). The ideal move generates a high margin per day of transit, and also positions the box in a high demand location where its queueing time is minimal, and from which an indefinite sequence of profitable lanes can be followed.
However, standing in the way are market imbalances in the demand for load movements. For example, suppose eastbound demand is greater than westbound, because of the large volume of goods that flow into California from Asia. If the network was managed haphazardly, the firm would find boxes queueing up in New York not earning revenue. (Empty repositioning has not proven to be economical.) Taking into account downstream queueing effects is critical when making fleet versus rail box decisions. Sometimes it is even preferable to allocate fleet boxes on seemingly unprofitable lanes, because they lead to locations whose outgoing lanes are highly profitable. In short, effective fleet management requires a full network perspective, on a real-time basis.
Hub Group manages its fleet through an internal pricing mechanism that is integrated with the information system, described above, used by the dispatchers to make real-time fleet decisions. Suppose a customer request to move a load on arc ij arrives. As indicated above, if there is a fleet box available the dispatcher's system essentially presents two options: use a fleet box or a rail box. How does the dispatcher choose? Next to each option is tallied the contribution margin, and in our notation the net difference between using a fleet box rather than a rail box equals r ij . If the dispatcher were to use a myopic policy, he would choose fleet if r ij > 0, and otherwise choose rail. However, this policy does not take into account network effects.
Instead, central management at corporate headquarters establishes, on a daily basis, an internal price c ij for accepting fleet box loads on arc ij. These prices are fed directly into the information system, so that in fact the dispatcher chooses the option maximizing contribution margin minus the current internal price.
If r ij − c ij > 0 then he allocates a fleet box, otherwise a rail box. In the recent past this internal price was an actual transfer price paid to corporate headquarters by local dispatching agencies, or "hubs", that were managed as separate profit and loss centers (Gallagher, 2003) .
When r ij is a known quantity, this internal pricing mechanism amounts to simply turning arcs off or on. To achieve the same effect, one need only consider either c ij = r ij + or c ij = r ij − , for some > 0.
However, in reality the r ij is a random quantity, so the true effect on the flow rate is not binary. So as to not overcomplicate matters, we assume r ij is a known quantity. This does not hinder the applicability of our work.
This internal pricing mechanism gives management control over the box allocations that are made across the network, yet without requiring that central be involved in daily transactional details. Instead, a senior manager monitors the aggregate build up of fleet boxes at locations across the network. As inventories build at an unprofitable location j, he simultanesouly increases the prices c ij for arcs leading into it. In this manner, he eventually shuts off all flow into node j. Conversely, as inventories shrink at a profitable location j, and the risk of stockout there increases, he decreases the prices c ij to encourage fleet boxes to move there.
Currently these prices are set heuristically using human judgement and experience. The purpose of this paper is develop a scientific, implementable approach for computing them that will optimize the firm's profits.
Other applications
Operational problems having similar structure arise in other industries. For example, the rental car companies face the issue of when to allow a customer to rent a car out of one location, but return it at another, called a one-way. Vacation travelers from the Northeast and Midwest often wish to rent cars for driving down to Florida, but prefer to fly home. Many business travelers wish to rent cars out of one airport, but drop them off at a different airport. Currently no firms are sophisticated enough to optimize the flow imbalances and drop-off charges, and repositioning is rare. Typically firms either forbid one-ways altogether, or set the drop-off charges so high that customers almost never do them. A few firms alternate drop-off charges between high and low over time, so as to manually guide cars to where they want them. There is considerable interest throughout the industry in tapping the economic potential of the one-way business, but as of yet there is a lack of models and technology for managing it effectively and so firms are necessarily cautious. Although we do not consider external market pricing, our models are able to estimate system-wide opportunity costs, which is a key step in this direction.
A similar problem arises in international container leasing firms, where the network spans the globe. For example, a shipper or carrier may rent an intermodal container out of Japan and return it months later in Los Angeles. In this setting, demand imbalances are largely due to the economic imbalances in international
trade.
Yet another example arises in the management of a taxicab company. Suppose telephone requests arrive over time for customer pickups at locations throughout a metropolitan area. Given the current location of the firm's taxis, the dispatcher must decide whether to accept the request, or outsource to another taxicab company with which it partners. In some cities taxicab companies may be permitted to reject a customer request outright.
Outline
We begin in Section 2 by formulating the problem as a semi-Markov decision process, which we use later in constructing a control policy. We show that the idea of using internal prices is theoretically correct, and that they are exactly calculated as the incremental change in the dynamic programming value function corresponding with the change in system state. Then in Section 3 we present a linear program that yields an upper bound on the long-run time average expected reward rate. However, this model ignores inventory buildups and stockouts, which are essential problem features. Nevertheless, we show in Section 4 that this model strengthens an inequality given by Sobel (1980) and Heyman (1980) , and extends its range of applicability to a network setting.
To carefully develop of our approach, and obtain exact results, we devote Section 4 to the special case of the Erlang loss system. The network problem reduces to this case when there is only a single node and the reward is strictly positive. We discuss the difficulties of incorporating the Erlang loss formula, or any approximation to it, into a math program that captures network flows. This leads us to a new exact analysis of the Erlang loss system, namely a recursion for computing the steady-state probability that a unit is available, from the perspective of an individual unit. To our knowledge, this quantity has not been directly considered in the queueing literature.
We then show that by approximating an event average with a time average, or more generally a Palm probability with a time stationary probability, we obtain a simple pair of equations in two variables whose solution in fact yields a strong upper bound for the Erlang loss probability, first derived by Harel (1988) using algebraic methods instead of Palm calculus as we do here. The advantage of the later is that, as we show in Section 5, this approximation concept can be easily applied to the network setting, and provides a new metaphor for capturing queueing and stockout effects in math programs.
In Section 6 we interpret the optimality conditions in terms of an equilibrium between linear programming agents who optimize their trajectories through the network, taking into account the negative externalities they impose on other units. We then reformulate our original nonlinear program into one that can be efficiently solved hundreds and thousands of times faster, using a nonlinear solver as a subroutine.
In Section 7 we use solution information from solving our model as input data into an auxiliary pricing problem. Using the resulting prices, we then construct a functional approximation to the dynamic programming value function, and use the Lindley equation to compute it. This yields a computationally efficient and relatively simple control policy based on a methodologically grounded solution to the firm's internal pricing problem. In Section 8 we report on the numerical results comparing our policy with other policies.
Brief literature review
To our knowledge, the queueing network control problem we consider in this paper has not been considered in the queueing theory literature. Posner and Bernholtz (1968) still represents the state-of-the-art in analyzing queueing networks having constant (or general) travel times. However, their analysis assumes that no control is exerted, the flows are irreducible, and all units have identical probabilistic behaviour.
This work follows a stream of research by the author in price-directed control mechanisms for managing operations. In Adelman and Nemhauser (1999) , Adelman (2002) , and Adelman (2003) , we construct policies directly from optimal dual prices of math programs, but in inventory settings that are much different from the queueing network setting considered here. The nonlinear program we consider in this paper bears no resemblence to the math programs previously considered, and we derive it using entirely new methods.
Furthermore, rather than using its Lagrangian prices in our control policy, we use prices obtained from an auxiliary problem that takes as input information obtained from its solution.
This work is also related to the growing literature on approximate dynamic programming methods. Our two-pronged approach of solving a nonlinear program, and then an auxiliary pricing problem to obtain parameters to an approximate value function, is new. Furthermore, this is the first paper using the Lindley equation to construct a functional approximation to the value function. This form is not a linear combination of basis functions, which has been prevalent in approximate dynamic programming approaches to date (de Farias and Van Roy, 2003) .
Our inspiration for using Palm calculus to formulate a math program comes from Bertsimas and NinoMora (1999) , for example, though our problem and application of it are much different. An advantage of this approach is that additional constraints and decision variables, important in applications, can be added with relative ease. Baccelli and Bremaud (2003) is an excellent, advanced reference on Palm calculus.
Dynamic fleet management problems have been extensively studied by Warren Powell and co-authors. Powell and Carvalho (1998) consider the problem faced by a trucking company in scheduling their fleet of trucks in a regional area. In their car distribution problem, Powell and Topaloglu (2002) consider the problem that a railroad faces in proactively repositioning and allocating rail cars in anticipation of future demand. In contrast, our problem has an accept/reject decision structure, without repositioning. As such, our work can be viewed as a revenue management problem (McGill and van Ryzin, 1999 ) on a queueing network, which has been unexplored territory to date. Our models also work at a higher level of aggregation and control than those of Powell, ignoring for instance the low level details of local drayage operations.
Formulation
The problem can be formulated as a semi-Markov decision process as follows. 
Given a system state, the controller can either reject the requested arc, which we denote by the empty set symbol ∅, or accept it by choosing one of the available units at the origin of the requested arc. Formally, in state s ∈ S the action-space is
This definition can be refined to enforce a chosen sequencing policy, e.g. that units be allocated on a firstcome-first-served basis.
Because arrivals of arc requests follow Poisson processes, the time between decision epochs, denoted by ∆, is exponentially distributed with mean 1/ ij∈E λ ij . This random variable is independent of the current state-action pair. Given a realization δ of ∆, and current state-action pair (s, a), the next state is determined
and the next s 0 equals ij with probability λ ij / i j ∈E λ i j , for all ij ∈ E. To express the next state compactly, we denote the transition law by the function f (s, a, δ, ij), where ij is the next requested arc.
We denote sample paths by ω ∈ Ω ⊆ (S × A × R) ∞ , i.e. sequences of state-action-durations. We use capitalized letters to represent random variables defined on sample paths. For every n = 0, 1, . . . , the random variable S(n) is the state at the beginning of epoch n, A(n) is the action chosen at the beginning of epoch n, and ∆(n) is the time between decision epoch n and n + 1. Hence, we can view a random sample path as a
n =0 ∆(n ) denote the absolute time of decision epoch n, where we assume T (0) = 0.
Let H(n) = {S(n ), A(n ), ∆(n )} n =0,1,...,n−1 S(n) denote the random history of the process leading up to beginning of decision epoch n, at which time the state is S(n). We use lowercase letters, e.g. h(n), to denote realizations of random variables. A policy π is a sequence {π n } n=0,1,... of conditional probability measures on A, so that given the history H(n) equals h(n), the probability of choosing action a ∈ A s(n) is π n (a| h(n)). Letting Π denote the space of all such randomized history-dependent policies, for every initial state S(0) = s the control problem is
where 1l{·} is the indicator function. If the process is weakly communicating, then J * (s) = J * does not depend on s.
The unichain optimality equations are
where F is the cumulative distribution function of ∆, g is the gain, and h(s) is the bias function. If (g, h(·)) solves (4), then sup s∈S J * (s) = g, and an optimal policy is given by the arg max of (4).
Given h, the integral in (4) computes the bias function as measured instantaneously after action a is taken in state s. We denote this by
In state s, an optimal control policy can be expressed simply. If A s = ∅ then we reject. Otherwise suppose
and reject otherwise. Hence, the theoretically correct internal price is
which depends on the current state s.
In what follows, we assume that the system is stationary, operating under a stationary control policy. LetĴ * denote the optimal expected reward rate in this case.
To derive our math programs, we will use Palm calculus. In particular we will use Palm probabilities in Little's Law, the rate conservation law, and the following theorem. Suppose {X(t) : t ∈ R} is a continuoustime stochastic process and Z is a point process of embedded epochs, which are jointly stationary on the same underlying probability space. Let P Z {·} denote the Palm probability of an event occuring at an arbitrary epoch in Z.
THEOREM 1 (Superposition of Point Processes). Suppose stationary point process Z, having intensity µ, is the superposition of stationary point processes
has intensity µ k . Then
We denote the time stationary probability of an event by P {·}, and the corresponding expectation operator by E. When the system is ergodic, Palm probabilities can be interpreted as empirical long-run event averages calculated at points of Z, whereas time stationary probabilities are empirical long-run time averages for the continuous-time process.
Upper bound
Let X ij be a decision variable that represents the rate at which units flow on arc ij, i.e. the intensity of the corresponding point process. Also let λ i = {j∈N :ij∈E} λ ij denote the demand rate for arcs eminating out of node i, given as data. The following linear program provides an upper bound onĴ * .
(LP) max
The objective function (6) maximizes the reward rate. Constraints (7) maintain flow balance at each node, requiring that the flow rate in equals the flow rate out. This is just the rate conversation law for a stationary process. Constraint (8) relates to Little's Law. For each arc ij, the quantity τ ij X ij is the expected inventory of units in transit on that arc. The justification for the terms X ij /λ i comes from the following.
PROPOSITION 1 Assume X = {X ij } are flow rates realized under some policy. Then the expected number of units waiting at a node i ∈ N is at least {j∈N :ij∈E} (1/λ i )X ij .
PROOF Consider the point process D i of unit allocations at node i having intensity {j∈N :ij∈E} X ij . Associate each point n in D i with a mark W n equal to the waiting time of the allocated unit, i.e. |t k | where k is the unit allocated. Because there is no backlogging, the allocation of a unit to arc ij coincides with the arrival of a request for arc ij. Furthermore, this arrival process evolves independently of the system.
Consider the time Z n ≤ W n spent by unit k waiting at the node for a request arrival, once it becomes the next to be allocated. From the memoryless property of the exponential distribution, Z n is exponentially distributed with mean 1/λ i , and so E[W n ] ≥ 1/λ i . The result then follows from Little's Law. 2
Hence, the left-hand side of (8) is a lower bound on the flow-based expected inventory across the network.
The right-hand side K is a tight upper bound, and the difference represents additional inventory at the nodes.
The constraints (9) require that the flow rate on each arc ij does not exceed the demand rate for that arc.
Any collection of X = {X ij } variables derived from the system in a steady-state equilibrium satisfies the constraints (7)- (10), and hence (LP) gives an upper bound on the optimal reward rate.
The advantage of (LP) is that it is easy to understand, and easy to compute using widely available linear programming software. However, the model ignores inventory and stockouts at the nodes, and the interaction between these. In particular, in order to support a given flow rate X ij some amount of inventory must be held at the node i. This should be taken into account in (8), but it is not. Furthermore, the right-hand side of (9) is overly optimistic because it ignores stockouts due to the unavailability of units. Because of these problems, we seek a more realistic math program. In the next section, we use the connection with Erlang's loss system to derive a new set of inequalities that capture these features.
Special case: Erlang's loss system
When there is only a single node and the reward r is strictly positive, the resulting system collapses to the Erlang loss system, originally studied by Erlang in 1917 in the context of telephony. We first assess the quality of the bound given by (LP) by comparing it with the exact flow rate for this system. Then we discuss the difficulties inherent in incorporating Erlang's loss formula, or any of the known approximations to it, into (LP). This leads us into an exact analysis of the Erlang loss system, where we obtain new results that can be incorporated simply into a nonlinear program. As we'll see, this nonlinear program extends gracefully to the network case. 
Quality of the upper bound
The linear program (LP) reduces to
where X represents the flow rate. Assuming r > 0 its optimal solution is X LP = min{λ, K τ +1/λ }. In contrast, using Erlang's loss formula, we know the exact value is
The quantity in parentheses on the right-hand side equals the probability that a server (unit) is available, or (1 − B(λτ, K)) where B(λτ, K) is known as the Erlang loss probability for a system with parameter λτ and K servers.
Understanding when the bound X LP is tight in the Erlang case is helpful in hypothesizing when the network bound from (LP) is likely to be tight. Figure 1 plots the relative error X LP /X exact as a function of τ for K = 3, 10, and 20, fixing λ = 1. The bound X LP overestimates X exact by no more than 27%.
Furthermore, the worst case bound improves as the number of units K increases. We intuitively expect this because X exact ↑ λ as K increases, whereas X LP = λ for all K > λτ + 1. The bound is also tigher when τ is either small or relatively large. Fixing K, as τ becomes larger units spend more time in transit and less time available for allocation, so that X exact ↓ 0, whereas X LP ↓ 0 also. On the other hand, as τ becomes smaller, units spend more time available for allocation so that X exact ↑ λ, whereas X LP ↑ λ also.
where (·)
+ takes the positive part of the enclosed quantity. Due to Proposition 1, this lower bound on B(λτ, K) is (marginally) stronger than the lower bound LP4= (1 − K/λτ ) + given in Harel (1988), which comes from Sobel (1980) and Heyman (1980) .
Incorporating Erlang loss into (LP)
Trivially, the Erlang loss formula B(λτ, K) could be incorporated into (11) as follows.
Alternatively, instead of the exact expression for B(λτ, K), we could use one of the many simpler bounds available. For example, one of the best (upper) bounds comes from Harel (1988), called UP1, which is
where ρ = λτ /K is known as the traffic intensity. In a network setting, such an expression could appear on the right-hand side of (9). However, this modeling approach is unworkable for a few reasons. One difficulty is in determining τ , which in a network would represent the expected return time to a node, after traversing the network. (Note: Even if τ could be estimated, the model would be an approximation because the return times across units would not be independent as in the Erlang loss model.) Another problem with this approach is that a true optimization may find it profitable to partition the units into separate subnetworks, i.e. the resulting network flows may not be irreducible. Hence, the optimization procedure would also need to compute an appropriate K and τ for each node. Not only would this be complex, these two variables appear in B (or its approximation) in a complex, nonlinear way.
Exact analysis
To motivate the analysis, first consider the following linear program for the case of a single unit, i.e. K = 1,
Here the decision variable P = E[1l{unit available}] is the time stationary probability the unit is available at the node. The constraint X ≤ λP says that the fraction of demand that can be captured is equal to the probability, or fraction of time in the ergodic case, the unit is at the node. However, as P increases, an opposite tension occurs because by Little's Law τ X + P = 1, so that X actually decreases. The optimal solution to (14) is indeed P * = 1 λτ +1 and X * = λ λτ +1 . The loss probability is 1 − P * = λτ λτ +1 . These are exact classical results for the M/M/1/1 queueing system. When K > 1, the quantity P represents the time stationary probability that an arbitrary unit is available at the node, assuming all units experience the same statistical reality. This would be true if the labels of the units play no role in allocating them to requests when multiple units are available at once. An example of such a rule is one that allocates the units in the order in which they become available (first-come-first-served), or one that chooses among the available units randomly. In general, when referring to a system having this property, we say that it has symmetric flows.
Whereas considerable research has been done on the loss probability B, to our knowledge the quantity P has not been widely studied or used. This is interesting, because as we'll see it is easier to approximate and use directly in models. Yet knowing P leads to B and vice versa, as the following arguments show. From Little's Law in (14), given P we know that X = (1 − P )/τ , where X is the flow rate of a single unit. Hence, the effective throughput is KX, and so the loss probability is B = 1−KX/λ = 1−
. Furthermore, the expected number of units available equals KP , because for any fixed unit k we have that
in the stationary system, and E[Number of units available] = E[ k∈K 1l{unit k is available}] = KP . These observations lead us to the following recursion to compute P for the Erlang loss system.
THEOREM 2 Consider an Erlang loss system having symmetric flows in equilibrium. Let P (K) be the time stationary probability an arbitrary fixed unit is available in a system having K units. Then P (K) satisfies the recursion
where P (0) = 0.
PROOF Let E denote the Poisson process of request arrivals, having intensity λ. Let D k denote the point process of allocations for unit k, for each unit k ∈ K, with intensity X k , and let U denote the point process of stockouts with rate u. Then clearly,
Fix a unit k ∈ K, and consider the event that this unit is available. Let
, and P U k denote the Palm probabilities for this event with respect to the indicated point processes. (We assume that the event is measured as seen by an arriving point, i.e. instantaneously before it occurs.) Then by the superposition of point processes, Theorem 1, we have
Let P k be the time stationary probability that unit k is available. From PASTA, we know that P E k = P k . Furthermore, at the time of any point in U we know that no units are available, and so P U k = 0. Also, P D k k = 1, because at the times unit k is allocated, unit k is available. Consequently, the above expression reduces to
Because the system has symmetric flows, X k is the same for all k, as are P k , and so the above becomes
Consider now the point process D −k = k =k D k of allocations to units other than k, having intensity
denote the Palm probability that unit k is available upon the arrival of points in D −k . From the superposition of point processes we have
Because X > 0, this implies
and therefore we have
To stress the dependence of P on the number of units K in the system, replace the notation P with P (K). Similarly, replace X with X(K). As seen by a unit being allocated, the state of the system follows the equilibrium distribution of a system with one less unit available. (This is known as moving units see time averages, or MUSTA, see Serfozo (1999) ). Consider a point in D −k , i.e. a point at which a unit other than k is allocated. From the symmetric flows assumption, the unit k is equally likely to be any of the remaining units, and so we have that P
. Plugging these last two into (16) yields
In what follows we'll need the following lemma.
PROOF By induction. Note that P (1) = 1 1+λτ > 0 = P (0). Now suppose K > 1. The induction hypothesis is that P (k) > P (k − 1) for all k = 1, 2, . . . , K − 1, which we now show implies the same relation for k = K.
From (15) we have
. To prove the second part, observe that
, which follows from P (1) < P (K). Noting that P (1) > 0 yields
which is the desired result. 2
Approximation leading to Harel's bound
Based on the above exact analysis, we now derive a simple nonlinear program that yields the upper bound UP1 due to Harel (1988) for the Erlang loss probability. The proof of Theorem 2 shows that we can substitute
Note that here X represents the flow rate for one unit only, and KX is the aggregate flow rate.
The idea is to approximate P (K − 1) with P (K). This is justified because Lemma 1 implies that {P (K)} is a Cauchy sequence, so that lim K→∞ |P (K) − P (K − 1)| = 0. In other words, we replace a Palm probability (event average) with a time stationary probability (time average), and this is justified asymptotically as the number of units K increases. For notational convenience we drop the dependence of P (K) on K by writing just P instead. We can then write the above as
Intuitively, λ − (K − 1)X represents the remaining available demand that can be captured by the Kth unit after the other K − 1 units satisfy as much as they can. The fraction of this surplus that can be captured by this single unit is proportional to the probability, or fraction of time, it is available for allocation.
Consider now the nonlinear program
The inequality captures the fact that demand can be rejected, say when r < 0. This program is much simpler than using (13) directly, yet it yields the same result.
THEOREM 3 Let K ≥ 2 and r > 0. The unique optimal solution to (18) is
Furthermore,
i.e. the solution yields Harel's upper bound.
PROOF Substitute P exact = P (K) and X exact = X into (17), and isolate X exact to obtain
Now eliminate P exact by substituting P exact = 1 − τ X exact , which is Little's Law rewritten, and isolate X exact . This yields
because P (K − 1) ≤ P exact by Lemma 1. Rearranging terms yields
Using the quadratic formula, there are two roots for f (X), given by
Substituting the positive root X + for X exact into (22), and noting that f (X + ) = 0, implies X exact ≥ X + .
However, this implies
which is infeasible. Consequently, we must have that X exact ≥ X − .
Next we show that X − and P − ≡ 1 − X − τ is a feasible solution to (18). Eliminate P from the first constraint by substituting P = 1 − τ X from the second constraint. This yields
which is the constraint f (X) ≤ 0 from above, and satisfied for X = X − . Note that
This in turn implies that P − = 1 − X − τ ≤ 1. Consequently, X − , P − is a feasible solution to (18). It must be the unique optimal solution as well. From the same argument as above, any X ≥ X + leads to P < 0 from the same argument as above. Because f (X) is strictly concave in X, any X such that X − < X < X + implies f (X) > 0 and is therefore infeasible. Furthermore, the largest X ≤ X − such that f (X) ≤ 0 is X − , and this maximizes the objective function in (18). Thus, we can set X Harel = X − and P Harel = P − , and the bounds (19) and (20) follow from statements above.
Lastly, we show (21). For convenience, define
The following two relations will prove useful:
and
Using β we can write (13) as Figure 2: Relative error, X Harel /X exact , for the Erlang loss system. using (23). We then have
using (24). Cancelling terms, this becomes 
Heuristic extension to a network
The analysis in Section 4 shows that by approximating a Palm probability (event average) with a time stationary probability (time average) in the Erlang loss system, we obtain an excellent approximation. This idea can be applied heuristically to derive an elegant and practically useful optimization model for the network case.
Let E ij denote the Poisson process of requests for arc ij, having intensity λ ij . When a request arrives, either a unit is allocated, a stockout occurs, or the request is rejected. Correspondingly, let D k ij denote the point process of unit k allocations to requests for arc ij, and let X k ij denote its intensity. Also let U ij denote the point process of stockouts (at node i) upon arrival of a request for arc ij, with intensity u ij . Let W ij denote the point process that counts rejections of requests for arc ij when there is not a stockout, having intensity w ij . Clearly then, we have the identity
Fix a unit k and arc ij. Consider the event that unit k is available at i as seen by an arriving point (instanteously before its arrival). Let P . Our key step is to make the approxi-
From the superposition of point processes, Theorem 1, combining all of the above yields
w ij ≥ 0, rearranging terms we can write this as
Intuitively, the expression λ ij − k =k X k ij is the surplus demand on arc ij, after all other units absorb their portion of demand. The inequality says that the fraction of this surplus demand that can be satisfied by unit k is no more than the probability, or fraction of time, the unit is at node i. The slack represents rejected demand during non-stockouts. This leads to the following nonlinear program.
The constraints (27) are the same as (7), except they now hold for every unit k. The constraints (28) come from Little's Law, because a unit k is either in transit on some arc or available at a node. Unlike in (8), this is an equality here because this new model captures inventory at the nodes. In fact, we can approximate the expected inventory at node i by k∈K P k i . Furthermore, (29), which we derived above, captures the notion of stockouts localized with unit k. Hence, (NLP) captures the two main features, i.e. inventory and stockouts, which are missing from (LP).
The inequalities (29) capture congestion effects, though not in a manner we are used to seeing. Fix an arc ij. Suppose unit k satisfies some demand for this arc, i.e. X k ij > 0, and that constraint (29) is tight for this k and ij. Suppose now that other units reroute themselves to satisfy marginally more demand for this arc, i.e. the other X k ij increase for k = k. The expression in parentheses decreases. Consequently, to maintain the same amount of flow X k ij on arc ij, unit k must spend more time at node i, i.e. P k i must increase. This is what it means to have congestion. Incidently, if the constraint (29) is loose for this k and ij, then demand is being rejected and some of it can instead be accepted to make up the difference under the above scenerio.
The following properties further demonstrate that feasible solutions to (NLP) exhibit correct behaviour.
PROPOSITION 2 Consider any feasible solution (X, P ) to (NLP).
If
2. For all ij ∈ E, we have k∈K X k ij < λ ij .
PROOF To prove the first statement, observe that from (29) we have
Hence, because P To prove the second statement, note that if X k ij = 0 for all k then the statement is trivially true, because we assume λ ij > 0. Now suppose there exists a k such that X k ij > 0. By (28), the assumption that τ ij > 0, and X, P ≥ 0 it follows that P k i < 1. Using this fact in (29) yields
because the parenthesized term in the middle expression must be > 0 from the argument in the previous paragraph. Collecting the X's yields the desired result. 2
Intuitively, the first statement in the proposition says that if a unit flows on arc ij, then it must spend a positive amount of time at both nodes i and j. The second statement says that it is impossible to satisfy all demand for an arc ij, which is true in reality because the demand process is stochastic.
The program (NLP) overcomes the inherent difficulties of applying Erlang's loss formula B(λτ, K), or one its approximations, directly to a network, as discussed in Section 4.2. In particular, we do not need to capture the expected return times of a unit to a node to estimate τ . This is present implicitly in the probabilities P k i . Furthermore, (NLP) allows each unit to follow any route it wants through the network, eliminating the need to determine how many units flow through each node to estimate K.
Although it may exist, we cannot offer the same theoretical justification for (25) as we had in Section 4.4.
However, one would expect that a unit k is less likely to be available at a node whenever some other unit is allocated, as compared with the time stationary probability it is available. Furthermore one would expect that both of these probabilities tend to one as the number of units increases. In other words, some form of Lemma 1 is intuitively plausible, though complicated by the fact that we now also have an accept/reject policy to contend with, and each unit is allowed to have its own probabilistic behaviour. Rather than pursue this further, believing that (NLP) is sensible we leave this issue aside for future work and move on to explore the practical questions of how to solve and use (NLP) for constructing control policies.
Duality and solution algorithm
In this section we show that optimal solutions to (NLP) correspond with equilibria between decentralized linear programming agents, one assigned to each unit, that locally optimize their trajectories through the network taking congestion into account. One could devise a solution algorithm that uses this result, or exploits other structure present in the formulation. Alternatively, one could solve (NLP) directly by using a nonlinear programming solver. However, empirically we obtain superior computational performance by iteratively solving a series of smaller, aggregated nonlinear programs, which we formulate. This approach has the additional benefit of being easy to implement in an off-the-shelf math programming modeling language and solver.
Decentralized linear programming agents
The key quantities that link the agents together are the Lagrangian multipliers, which we denote by u k ij , associated with the constraints (29). At optimality, u k ij represents the marginal value of demand on arc ij, from unit k's perspective. This is indeed a complex value to assess, because it takes into account downstream flows of unit k that occur subsequent to arc ij.
Suppose that some other unit k is available at node i when demand for arc ij arrives, but unit k = k satisfies this demand. Then we can also interpret u k ij as the opportunity cost suffered by unit k . The idea behind the following linear program is to charge unit k for the opportunity costs of all other units that are available. This motivates unit k to avoid allocations that lead to nodes having high congestion, and whose subsequent flows are valuable to other units, because this increases the opportunity cost payments made.
For the moment, fix the quantities u k ij and X k ij for all units k = k. Consider the following program that involves decision variables X k , P k only for unit k. It is indeed a linear program because the quantities for other units k are fixed.
(P k ) max
The constraints are the same as (NLP), but for unit k only. It is important to note that the decision variables X k ij for unit k also appear on the right-hand side of constraints (29) for other units k = k, but these constraints are absent from (P k ). Instead, the Lagrangian multipliers for these constraints, u k ij , appear in the objective function (31). The expression
and hence it represents the expected total opportunity cost payment incurred by unit k upon an allocation to demand for arc ij. Another way to interpret (31) is to say that we are penalizing unit k for causing violations to constraints (29) on other units k .
The dual program for unit k is important, as it will provide the dual variables u k ij , associated with constraints (34), that are used in the objective functions of the linear programs (P k ) solved by other agents k . Let V k i be the dual price associated with constraints (32), representing the marginal value to unit k of additional flow through node i. Let θ k denote the dual price for constraint (33), which measures the marginal value of unit k per unit time. Then the dual of (P k ) is
The complementary slackness conditions are
Inequalities (38) say that the reward r ij plus the future value of flowing through node j can be no more than the value forfeited at node i, plus the opportunity cost for unit k satisfying this demand, plus the opportunity cost incurred by other units k , plus the opportunity cost of time spent traveling on arc ij.
Inequalities (39) say that the opportunity cost of time for unit k can be no smaller than the opportunity cost of the excess demand at node i after other units have satisfied their portion of demand. The condition (42) says that the opportunity cost θ k is assessed the same at each node i through which unit k passes (spends any time at).
Fixing a set of primal-dual feasible solutions (X, P ), (u, V, θ), denote the point-to-set mapping of optimal primal-dual solutions for agent k by
Of course, this set only depends on (X k , P k ), u k for other agents k = k, but we supress this for notational convenience. Let
denote the collection of point-to-set mappings over all units k. We then have the following result, which means that optimal solutions to (NLP) correspond with Nash equilibria among the linear programming agents discussed above.
THEOREM 4 A solution (X, P ), (u, V, θ) is a fixed point of the inclusion
if and only if it satisfies the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions for (NLP).
PROOF It suffices to show that the collection of linear programming optimality conditions taken over all agents k is exactly the same as the KKT conditions. First note that if (X, P ) is feasible to all the linear programs, then it is feasible to (NLP), and vice versa, because all the linear programming constraints together make up the constraints in (NLP). We also have u ≥ 0, which is required of the Lagrangian multipliers for (29). The collection of dual feasible constraints from (D k ), i.e. (38)- (39), over all k is precisely the first order optimality conditions. Lastly, the collection of complementary slackness conditions (41)- (43) is precisely those for (NLP). 2
As a consequence, the Lagrangian multipliers for (27) are V 
Solution algorithm
A difficulty with iteratively solving the linear programs above is that the solution changes only one unit at a time, which is time consuming as the number of units grows. In our experiments on test instances, we find that in optimal solutions the units will partition into just a handful of different prototypical units, with multiple copies sharing the same probabilistic behaviour. This suggests that an efficient solution algorithm ought to change the solutions of many units at once. Our nonlinear program (18) for the Erlang loss model in fact has multiple copies of only one prototype. We now generalize this idea to a network.
Let K be partitioned into M prototypes, and let M = {1, . . . , M } denote the set of prototypes. Denote the number of copies of prototype m by k m ≥ 1, given as fixed input data, so that m∈M k m = |K|. Whereas in (NLP) the decision variables X, P are indexed by units k, we now index them by prototypes (m), where we use parentheses to distinguish between prototypes and units. This results in many fewer decision variables and constraints, provided M is much smaller than |K|. The resulting nonlinear program is as follows.
Algorithm Iterative nonlinear programming
let improvement from adding a prototype > 0 while improvement from adding a prototype > 0 do begin a new prototype:
for all pairs (m 1 , m 2 ) ∈ M × M \ {m 1 } do let improvement from transfer > 0 while (improvement from transfer > 0 AND (km 1 > 0)) do let km 1 ← km 1 − 1; km 2 ← km 2 + 1 solve (NLP-M) calculate improvement from transfer if improvement from transfer == 0 then let km 1 ← km 1 + 1; km 2 ← km 2 − 1 end while end for calculate improvement from adding a prototype end while solve (NLP-M) To approximately solve (NLP) using this formulation, we employ an algorithm that partitions the units into prototypes, i.e. chooses M and the k m . Although many such algorithms are conceivable, Figure 3 provides one that we have found to be effective in our experimentation. It forms a partition by iteratively solving (NLP-M), and on each iteration it either starts new prototypes or moves units between existing ones. On the surface it may seem inefficient to solve so many nonlinear programs, but this turns out not to be the case. The key is that each instance is nearly identical to the previous one. Hence, the solution from the previous instance is nearly optimal for the next instance. When this previous solution is used as a starting point, the solver has almost no work to do.
On a real-world instance having 6 nodes and 15 arcs, given in the appendix, varying the number of units K, Table 1 shows the CPU time required to solve (NLP) directly, versus the iterative algorithm in Figure   3 to solve (NLP-M). We used AMPL/MINOS 5.5 with default algorithmic settings, running on a 1.7GHz
Xeon Intel processor. CPU times for the iterative algorithm are insignificant and relatively insensitive to the number of units, whereas for (NLP) the times explode exponentially fast in the number of units. We did notice some CPU time sensitivity to numerical scaling, although the objective value obtained was not
# of units (NLP)
Iterative (NLP-M) 7 Price-directed control methodology
We now construct an effective control policy using information obtained from solving (NLP-M) or (NLP).
One possibility is to use (38), so that we accept a request for arc ij and unit k if the reduced profit
and reject otherwise. This mimics the action of complementary slackness (41). We call this the static allocation policy. Alternatively, we can use the solution to (NLP) to construct a randomized static allocation policy. Given a request for arc ij arrives, for unit k we accept it with probability
where R k ij is the slack in (29). These policies do not take into account the current state of the network. It is possible, for instance, to accept a request that would move a unit to a currently high congested node, causing this unit to incur a substantial opportunity cost as it waits. The inherent network imbalance in the demand rates will cause buildups of inventory at some nodes while there are stockouts elsewhere. In this section, we construct a dynamic allocation policy that is based on an intelligent approximation to the dynamic programming value function. To simplify matters we work with (NLP-M) except that we restrict it to a single prototype, and denote it by (NLP-1). This permits us to drop the superscripts k and (m).
Auxiliary pricing problem
We begin by considering an auxiliary pricing problem, which is exact for a single unit. Given a solution to (NLP-1), consider the subnetwork (N * , E * ) defined by
which are the active nodes and arcs. From Little's Law we can estimate the expected total time spent at node j ∈ N * , which we denote by W j , by solving
for W j , where
is the flow rate through node j.
We now formulate an auxiliary pricing problem that evaluates a single unit using a semi-Markov process that tracks its flow through the network. Event epochs are the times at which the unit is allocated. The state-space equals the set of active arcs E * , so that in state ij the unit has just been allocated to a request for arc ij and will begin its transit time τ ij after receiving reward r ij . Upon reaching node j, it expects to spend time W j , from above, until being allocated again. With probability X ji /X j it is allocated to a request for arc ji .
Let h ij denote the bias of a unit in state ij, and let ψ denote the long-run time average reward it collects.
Then the unichain semi-Markov policy evaluation equations are
We can denote the right-most term, which calculates the expected bias from node j, by
Therefore, instantaneously after the reward r ij is collected, the bias equals V j −ψ·(τ ij + W j ) . More generally, at any time after allocation on arc ij, if Γ denotes the (random) time until the unit is allocated again, then
is the bias.
Dynamic programming value function approximation
Given the exact single unit analysis above, we now construct a functional approximation to the true bias function h(·) in the optimality equations (4). The idea is to decompose h(·) by unit, and to price that unit based on the node it is approaching or is located at, and the expected opportunity cost incurred until it is allocated again. This mimics the logic in (53). For each state s ∈ S, let a * (s) = arg min a∈As t a be the next unit to be allocated, assuming first-in-first-out (FIFO), or ∅ if none is available. We then approximate
where Γ k | s denotes the random time until unit k is allocated again, starting from system state s. It consists of the unit's remaining transit time (t k (s)) + , plus the waiting time at the destination node i k (s). We exclude the value of unit a * (s) from the main summation, because the arc for which it sees demand has been revealed in s to be s
We could substitute the approximation (54) directly into the right-hand side of the optimality equations (4), to obtain a control policy. However, the integral is difficult to evaluate. Instead, we follow the logic of (53) and approximate the bias instantaneously after a decision epoch with
The notation (s, a) stresses the dependence on the next state instantaneously after taking action a in state s, as governed by (1) with δ = 0 and (2). In contrast with (54), this summation includes the unit a. The fixed h term is excluded, because the arc demand to be seen next is still unknown instantaneously after a decision epoch. The control policy then follows the simple decision rule (5), so that we accept if
and reject otherwise.
The approximation (55), and hence the policy (56), does not depend on the order in which units are allocated when multiple units are available. Hence, it is not important that we assume FIFO, which is usually not followed in practice anyway. To see this, note that the sum
where Q i (w, (s, a)) is the number of units approaching or at node i after w time units, among those that are doing so at time 0 instanteously after the state-action pair (s, a). Hence, assuming node i is active, Q i eventually reaches 0 and stays there. On every sample path, the Q i functions are the same regardless of the allocation order, and hence so is the left-hand summation. 
Interpretation and simplification
Our approximation (55) captures salient network externalities. Consider a decision epoch at which a request for arc i 0 j 0 arrives, and there is a unit available. For the sake of discussion we assume FIFO ordering. Figure 4 shows the current state of the system, as seen by nodes i 0 and j 0 . Unit 1 is still in transit to node i 0 , while units 2 and 3 are available for allocation with unit 3 at the head of the line. Units 4 and 5 are still in transit to node j 0 , and unit 5 will arrive sooner, i.e. t 5 < t 4 . The distance on the line to the queue represents the transit time remaining, (t k ) + , for each unit k. Unit 6 is available for allocation at node j 0 , though no request is available at this moment for an arc eminating from node j 0 .
If we accept the current request for arc i 0 j 0 , then unit 3 will move into the position indicated by the arrow, having remaining transit time τ i 0 j 0 . It cuts in front of unit 4, which is in transit originating from some further away node to j 0 than i 0 . Hence, we expect unit 4 to be worse off than had we rejected,
. While the forward units 5 and 6 are not directly affected, the allocated unit 3 may experience delay due to queueing behind them, reflected in E[Γ 3 | (s, 3)]. Lastly, units 1 and 2 stand to gain if the request is accepted, because the expected times until their next allocation decreases due to less forward congestion. That is, we expect
On the other hand, if we reject the current request for arc i 0 j 0 , then units 4, 5, and 6 are not directly affected. Unit 3 will have to wait until the next request arrival at node i 0 , and we may subsequently reject a random sequence of arriving requests at node i 0 until unit 3 is eventually allocated. We also expect units 1 and 2 to experience greater delay until being allocated again, as compared with the situation where the current request is accepted. These effects are captured by
Units elsewhere in the network may also be affected. For example, increased congestion at node j 0 may discourage flow to j 0 from other nodes. This may increase delay for units at these other nodes. However, these interactions are indirect, longer range, and more difficult to assess. We consequently simplify the policy (56) by capturing the effect of the accept/reject decision only on units associated with nodes i 0 and j 0 . We describe this next.
Denote the set of units with destination i in state s by Then the set of units that are directly affected by the accept/reject decision for a request for arc i 0 j 0 is
where the units included in the second term are those that would be delayed if the request was accepted, such as unit 4 in Figure 4 . Because only the unit allocated changes location, assuming a * (s) = ∅ the rule (56) becomes
The current reward r i 0 j 0 plus the value of destination node j 0 must exceed the opportunity cost of leaving the current node i 0 plus the opportunity cost of the total incremental expected delays that would be incurred by the move. Then we accept.
Recalling the discussion from the introduction of the paper, the rule (57) gives us a simple expression for the firm's internal price,
We next show how this can be easily approximated in real-time on a transactional basis.
Approximating the expectation
We show how to quickly approximate E[Γ k | (s, a)]. We will assume FIFO ordering, but as discussed above this does not affect the policy. Figure 5 tracks the flow of a unit from the time it arrives at a node, until it departs allocated. There are three components to the expectation E[Γ k | (s, a)]: the deterministic remaining travel time (t k ) + , the expected waiting time at the node until reaching the head of the line (i.e. between points 1 and 2 in Figure 5 ), and the expected time until it is allocated (i.e. between points 2 and 3). The middle component is difficult to assess because it depends on the waits of other units ahead of k, and in the future additional units may be inserted ahead of k by allocations at other, closer nodes. We construct a recursion to estimate it.
Fix node i. Let K i (s, a) denote the set of units at node i instantaneously after taking action a in state s.
Order the units k ∈ K i (s, a) by increasing t k , so that (n) denotes the unit in front of which there are n − 1 other units. Clearly then
where we subscript by i to emphasize that this is the ordered list for node i. Let n k denote the position of unit k in this list.
Consider now the Lindley equation of classical queueing theory, applied to our setting. It is
where
, represent the random time for unit (n) between time points (1,2) and (2,3), respectively, given that the current state-action pair is (s, a). We also assume that there is no overtaking by future units allocated on arcs leading to node i (as discussed in Section 7.3, such units are charged for the incremental delay imposed on other units by overtaking). Taking the expectation of (59) yields (2, 3) ] to the unconditional expectation, over all units, we obtain the simple approximate recursion
With this calculation in hand, we can approximate the expected delay for unit k until allocation by
This, and the recursion (60) above, are trivial to evaluate numerically during real-time operation of the system.
It only remains to show how to estimate E[W i (2, 3)]. First we approximate the steady-state probability that a request is accepted, given it is for arc ij, by (51), dropping k. This implies that the probability we accept a request, given it is for an arc eminating from node i, is
where λ * i = {j∈N * :ij∈E * } λ ij is the effective demand rate out of node i. Next we assume that the sequence of accept/reject decisions follows a sequence of independent, identically distributed Bernoulli random variables with the above acceptance probability, so the number of trials until success follows the geometric distribution. This implies that the expected number of trials until success is the inverse of (62), and therefore we
In summary, by making the approximation (55) we obtain the control policy (56), which by focusing on certain units reduces to (57). It requires |N * | + 1 parameters, which includes the V i for each node and the single value ψ. We obtain these parameters by solving the auxiliary pricing problem (52) using the optimal solution of (NLP-1) as input data. To implement the policy, we approximate the expectations using (61) and the recursion (60). This requires an additional parameterÊ[W i (2, 3)] for each node, which we calculate using (63). In total, the control policy uses a total of only 2|N * | + 1 parameters. This is small, considering the complexity of the system.
Numerical results
We conducted a series of numerical experiments to compare the price-directed control policy with both the static and randomized allocation policies discussed at the opening of Section 7. We also compared against the policy that exerts no control, i.e. accepts every request that arrives when there is a unit available for allocation.
We also compared against the price-directed policy using adapted prices. The idea is as follows. We first ran the price-directed policy over some long time horizon. Using empirical estimates of W j and the fractions X ji /X j in (52), we then re-solved the auxiliary pricing problem and updated ψ and the V 's. This is analogous to the policy evaluation step of dynamic programming. We also updated the estimatesÊ[W i (2, 3)]
for each node i using empirical averages. We ran two or three subsequent adaptations.
We used two basic datasets, the first one given by the real-world data in the appendix. The second is the same dataset, except the demand rates λ are multiplied by a factor of 10. For each dataset we ran six instances obtained by varying the number of units from K = 20, 100, 400, 1000, 2000, 4000. This gave a total of 12 instances. These instances respresent a full spectrum of traffic intensities, which is the critical factor affecting approximation quality for the Erlang loss system.
For each instance and policy, we simulated the system through the arrival of 250,000 requests, and initialized statistics after 20,000 requests to reduce initialization bias. We empirically found this to be long enough to achieve acceptable statistical convergence, with an average standard deviation of less than . Table 2 : Simulated policy performance relative to the nonlinear programming objective value, for instances with nominal λ.
over 13 replications. In cases where the policy performed (slightly) better than the upper bound, taking a longer sample resulted in convergence to the upper bound.
We report the results in Tables 2 and 3 , where the later table reports on those instances having λ scaled up by 10. To give a sense for the tightness (or looseness) of the upper bounding linear program, for each instance we report the optimal objective value of (NLP-1) divided by the upper bound. These results are consistent with how the Erlang loss results displayed in Tables 1 and 2 compare with each other. Namely, the gap between (NLP-1) and the upper bound is a convex function of K, and appears to become negligible as K gets larger or smaller.
For each policy we report the empirical time-average reward, divided by the optimal objective value of (NLP-1). This measures how close the policy gets to the policy implied by an optimal solution to (NLP-1).
The adapted price-directed policy (PD-adapt) closely tracks the objective value of (NLP-1) for small and large K, but somewhat less so for intermediate K.
When the gap between (NLP-1) and the upper bound is small, the policy essentially performs optimally. Adaptation really only helped improve the policy when this gap tended to be large, which makes sense because there is less accurate information contained in (NLP-1).
As expected, the randomized static allocation policy (random), the static allocation policy (static), and the accept-all (all) policy performed poorly. These policies are unable to avoid buildups in inventory at nodes having a surplus net demand in, and therefore, in contrast with the price-directed policy, they degrade as the number of units increases. This becomes less of an issue with fewer units in the system.
Concluding remarks
On the above instances, we found there was little or no difference between solving (NLP-1) and (NLP-M).
For larger networks, we expect for there to be a difference, because multichain flows will arise from there being different prototypes. In this case, an auxiliary pricing problem could be solved for each subnetwork corresponding with a prototype. The policy could then be modified to ensure that the number of units in each subnetwork remains constant through time, equal to the number suggested by iteratively solving Table 3 : Simulated policy performance relative to the nonlinear programming objective value, for instances with magnified λ.
(NLP-M). Whenever a customer request arrives, if a unit is available it could be priced out with respect to every eligible prototype, and then the most profitable one could be selected.
Another issue we leave to future work, which sometimes arises in problems having similar structure, is that of non-revenue generating, or empty, repositioning. Certainly our math programs can be extended to include additional variables, say Y k ij , that represent the repositioning of units from i to j, and which would appear as additional costs in the objective function. Adjustments would then need to be made to the auxiliary pricing problem, as well as the policy (57). One possibility is to reposition a unit, say upon its arrival at node i, to node j if the cost of doing so plus the opportuniy cost c ij given by (58) is negative. This is the same idea as (57), except replacing r ij with the negative of the repositioning cost. Table 6 : X solution for real-world instance, aggregated over prototypes. Harel, A. (1988) . Sharp bounds and simple approximations for the Erlang delay and loss formulas. Management Science 34, 959-972.
